A survey* carried out immediately after the Irish referendum outlines a very worrying landscape for the future of European integration. Jose Ignacio Torreblanca explores.
As the European Union tries to recover from the hangover of the Irish no vote, information is coming to light which provides some understanding of the events which took place on June 12th. A survey* carried out immediately after the referendum outlines a very worrying landscape for the future of European integration.
First of all, the poll shows that the Irish government failed to take the referendum seriously enough. Half of those who abstained and one of every four "no" voters attributed their decision to a lack of information regarding the Treaty. Besides, the study also showed that the arguments of campaigners in favour of the yes vote were far from being persuasive, so much so that even supporters of the Lisbon Treaty described the opposition campaign as more convincing. Taking into account that a majority of voters claim to have made up their minds during the campaign itself (a third of those polled even confessed to having switched allegiance as a result of it) the outcome is not as surprising as it might at first have seemed.
But more importantly, the study demonstrates that the European Union not only suffers communication problems, but also has a severe legitimacy deficit within certain sections of society and, equally, a significant generational problem. Whilst people over the age of 55 voted in favour of the Treaty (by as much as twenty five percent), along with professionals and businessmen (by a considerable twenty percent) and amongst people with higher education (a fourteen percent difference), the no vote won hands down (by an incredible fifty percent) amongst manual workers, voters under the age of thirty (by thirty percent) and women (by twelve percent).
This polarisation of Irish public opinion is in keeping with something which can be observed in other member states as well; for the working class, European integration and globalization are two sides of the same coin. In the same way that a clear majority of Europeans (63%) think globalisation benefits business rather than ordinary people, a growing segment of public opinion perceives integration as a project with a fundamentally economic agenda, liberal in its essence, which constitutes a threat to job security.
Are there reasons to fear Europe? There certainly are. Since the nineteen eighties, policies to create and liberalise markets have been driven forward very rapidly, giving rise to an economic and monetary union in which goods, capital, people and services all flow freely. However, policies geared to market correction or related to wealth redistribution (health, education, fiscal policy, pensions, environment etc.), have either advanced very sluggishly or have remained confined to the national arena, perceived as unworkable or lacking viability by Europeans. Such a skewed European integration leads to social tensions which are ignored at the risk of a grave legitimacy crisis, some of the effects of which have already manifested themselves. Demonstrations in Brussels against the Commission's policies have long been seen, but the burning of the European flag by protestors is a recent development (and a symbolic effort worth noting given the price of fuel).
What this means is that Euro scepticism has a rational and not merely sentimental basis, which is frequently how it is explained away. An overwhelming majority (85%) of those polled valued Ireland's EU membership positively and want it to continue, but at the same time, there are economic and social demographics which do not benefit as much as others from integration, leading to discontent being voiced when the opportunity arises.
Just as worrying as this social rupture is the disconnect with younger voters which the study reveals. The European Union has lived off the feelings of identification built on the ruins of the Second World War. But whilst studies show that Franco-German reconciliation continues to move Europeans over the age of 55, it can hardly act as an engine for Europeanism amongst younger generations. Without a narrative glue of its own beyond the success of the European single market, it is difficult for the EU to fix an identity in the minds of younger generations. Will this rich, male and elderly Europe disappear along with those who support it today? Or will it continue in older, highly educated, male hands indefinitely?
