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15 November 2004
A New IDentity, 17 November 2004
By Ian Cuddy
Keynote: Rt Hon David Blunkett MP, Home Secretary
Greeted outside the conference by a dozen protestors from the NO2ID campaign who burned a giant mock identity card bearing his likeness, the Home Secretary David Blunkett arrived looking relaxed and confident. Appropriately enough, he opened his speech by telling delegates: "I am very happy to take on the challenge of those who feel extremely strongly about the issue of identity cards and the protection of our identity".
Blunkett used his keynote address to the IPPR conference to rebuff critics of the scheme and insist that ID cards were an essential response to the key challenges of crime, terrorism, fraud, illegal working and immigration. He also argued that the card would be a "major contributor" to reinforcing citizenship and social cohesion, tackling racism and xenophobia, by showing that immigrants working in the UK were doing so legitimately. "If we really want to get a grip on the sweat shop sub-economy then we will need, I am afraid to those who disagree with me, ID cards to be able to do it." He admitted that the ID would not stop terrorism, but it would make, he said, "a real contribution, albeit not a complete one", primarily by making it more difficult for terrorists to assume multiple identities in order to escape detection.
The ID card programme which the Home Office is legislate on and develop is unlike any other in Europe and the world, Blunkett said, being far more wide-ranging and built upon a secure and verifiable databse of biometrics. The Home Secretary saw the card possibly becoming "superfluous" in years to come as biometric technology advances - the fundamental aspect of the project is the database on which details are stored.
On the issue of personal privacy, he challenged opponents by stating: "I think that it's time to take on those who simply believe that if governments are engaged in trying to ensure that people's true identity can be ascertained, there is some suspicious and dangerous philosophy behind it." He went on to accuse supermarkets loyalty cards of being a greater affront to personal privacy than the "very limited access and use of information" planned under the ID card scheme, suggesting it was perhaps an appropriate time for a wider debate about the use and sharing of personal information.
Following assurances about due oversight and accountability, the Home Secretary concluded that it was sensible to move forward on ID cards as an addition to work planned and ongoing with biometric passports.
Katherine Courtney, Programme Director, Home Office ID Cards Team
With the Home Secretary setting out the political will behind the scheme, Katherine Courtney's presentation focused on outlining the basis of the proposed national ID card and Register and its practical implementation. The scheme itself would need to be inclusive and deliver the successful enrolment of the UK population of adult residents, she said - it would represent "the most inclusive scheme that the Government has attempted to put in place". The Home Office faces the challenge of being able to develop a verification system that is easy, quick and robust and will prevent multiple ID's from getting onto the register.
The core proposition is to build upon the decision to include biometric identifiers in passports which in turn, form the building blocks of the ID card scheme. Enrolment pilots had found that no single biometric was sufficiently accurate or suitable for all (people who are blind or have cataracts cannot use iris-identification, individuals with disabilities have difficulties using fingerprint readers, for example). To maximise success rates, the Home Office has opted to use a combination of three identifiers - iris, facial and fingerprint biometrics.
Courtney also set out, for the first time publicly, the possible uses of verification - many of which appeared far removed from the objective of countering serious crime earlier described by the Home Secretary. Examples given included enforcement of parking fines, as well as preventing underage sales of cigarettes, alcohol, DVDs and lottery tickets - the card therefore providing not only proof of identity, but also proof of age. The other uses of verification as an anti-crime measure were apprehension of suspects and applications for gun licenses. Several other potential applications for verification were set out:
| | · | Applications for banking services, mortgages and new accounts; |
| | · | Applications for TV licenses, vehicle excise licenses and postal redirection services |
| | · | Receipt of benefits; |
| | · | Preventing illegal work: Job applicant ID checks and CRB disclosures; |
| | · | Applications for driving tests; |
| | · | Access to public services, such as registering at a GP surgery. |
Vicki Chapman, Head of Law Reform, Law Society
Vicki Chapman's address to the conference was a methodical dismantling of the Government's case for identity cards, examining whether the proposed scheme was a 'proportionate' response to the issues that the Government was seeking to address.
Drawing on evidence to date, Chapman said that in terms of preventing terrorism, experiences in Spain has shown that compulsory ID cards had done nothing to stop the attacks in Madrid. Similarly, an ID card was unlikely to prevent illegal working or protect victims of unscrupulous exploitation as in the Morecambe Bay tragedy. On immigration, asylum and access to government services, new asylum seekers already have an Application Registration Card which is used to access services. While the ID card scheme may help to tackle benefit fraud, Chapman questioned whether this represented a proportionate response.
Chapman stressed that the scheme would only work if information recorded on the national register was accurate and up-to-date. The Draft Bill places a requirement on individual to keep their information updated and to notify the loss of the card, making failure to observe these an offence punishable by fines or imprisonment. However 40 per cent of London's population frequently change address, and would it be realistic to fine someone fleeing from domestic violence, she asked, warning that the scheme could result in services becoming unavailable to those most in need of them.
Chapman was also critical of the Government's refusal to provide key details about the programme such as costs, concluding that full disclosure with proper costing was essential for effective pre-legislative scrutiny.
Richard Thomas, Information Commissioner
Is the Information Commissioner for or against the scheme? Opening his address, Richard Thomas told delegates that in his independent position, he could be neither. His concern was whether such a scheme would comply with data protection laws and avoid excessive collection and processing of data.
The Information Commissioner said that he had voiced "considerable concerns" about the Government's proposals and felt that the Government had gone some way to addressing some, but not all, of his points. He welcomed in particular that the Home Office had recognised that the statutory purposes of the card should appear on the face on the bill and confirmed citizens' right to see and correct their records. But stressing the need for adequate safeguards, he said the scheme had "the potential for quite severe detriment where cases of mistaken identity are involved".
Thomas said the Draft ID Card Bill was "quite misleading", insofar as it encompassed a package of proposals of which the ID card element, according to the Information Commissioner, was "not so important". The main issue of concern, he said, was the infrastructure and the associated arrangements, in the form of the national ID card register, comprising a vast database and unique identifier, which would effectively allow a detailed track of a wide range of an individual's movements. He questioned the relevance of some of the information requirements - was it necessary to store all previous addresses? In a strongly-worded criticism of the Government, he also stated: "It is unacceptable that I should have to need the consent of security services before I can carry out an investigation or audit".
There are still many unknowns about the scheme, the Information Commissioner said, particularly those around the scope of the serious organised crime which this scheme proposes to address. Thomas voiced other concerns about function creep, noting that the paper-based ID card introduced in the UK during WW2 originally had three purposes but eventually expanded to 39 purposes, including the prevention of bigamous marriages. He concluded that a Privacy Impact Assessment was urgently required.
William Dutton, Oxford Internet Institute
William Dutton gave a stark warning that the history of technology has shown that every new innovation produces a 'dual effect' that makes the long-term consequences of its application difficult to predict. Technologies which originally seem beneficial can result in detrimental effects, he said, citing the telephone as an example of a technology can protect our privacy but also lead to this being invaded.
Technologies such as the ID card and national register. Dutton added, cannot be looked at in isolation, but need to be considered in the way of how it could interact with others. The complex interactions between speed cameras, CCTV cameras, satellite technology and the internet contributed to what he called a 'citizen surveillance society', leading into what could soon become a 'surveillance spiral' and 'biometric escalation'.
He argued that while much has been staked on public opinion and general support for the ID card scheme, there was a risk that minority rights could be compromised by majority will. His final criticism was the programme was based on 'outdated' idea of central databases, 1950s which did not reflect the reality of the networked information age of the internet.
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